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I. Introduction 
 
 What explains the persistence of certain debates in corporate law? Many 
fundamental questions remain unresolved despite dozens of years of research, 
countless conferences, and innumerable studies, both theoretical and, more 
recently, empirical. This is puzzling, since one would expect time and evidence to 
move us toward a resolution of debates about what is the most efficient way of 
doing something. This essay argues that these long-standing and unresolved 
debates are such because they are not really debates about the merits of the 
issues but rather what Thomas Sowell called “a conflict of visions.”1 The real 
debate is a behind-the-scenes tussle between those with a faith in processes (like 
markets) and those with a faith in expertise. Until this debate is had in the 
forefront, these other debates will remain unresolved. 
The most long-standing and hackneyed debate in corporate law,2 and the 
one that I will use to illustrate my argument, is whether the American way of 
making corporate law – a state-based approach allowing choice of law not tied to 
physical location of people, plants, or equipment in any way – is one that will lead 
toward good rules (states compete in a “race to the top,” developing rules good 
for shareholders and society at large) or bad ones (states compete in a “race to the 
bottom,” developing rules good for managers or special interests within society). 
Hundreds of academic articles have been written on both sides without resolving 
the question.3 The intractability of the debate has persisted despite dozens of 
sophisticated and seemingly neutral empirical analyses that have tested the 
impact of corporate law rules on firm value. One might think that empirical 
research could “answer” the question, but it seems to have only emboldened the 
opposing camps.  
 One answer to the persistence puzzle might be politics. In general, 
defenders of corporate law federalism are on the right of the political spectrum 
and critics are on the left.4 These political commitments, be they to party, group, 
class, or whatever, may be sufficient to trump any evidence or analysis. There is 
some evidence to support this view. The modern debate started with a classic 
exchange between a Kennedy-appointed SEC chair, William Cary (a bottomer), 
                                                   
‡ Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. 
1 See THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLES 
(Basic 2007). 
2 Professor John Coffee has called the race-to-the-top versus race-to-the-bottom debate “the most 
overwritten theme in academic literature on corporate law.” Remarks of John C. Coffee, Jr. in 
Symposium, The Direction of Corporate Law: The Scholars’ Perspective, 25 J. CORP. L. 79 (2000).  
3 A Westlaw search for “race to the top” and “race to the bottom” and Delaware reveals over 900 
articles as of December 2008. 
4 See id. (“Delaware's hegemony in the market for corporate charters represents neither the 
victory for regulatory arbitrage and efficiency that ‘conservative’ scholars have proclaimed nor the 
defeat for public policy that ‘liberal’ scholars have bemoaned.”). 
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and a Reagan-appointed federal judge, Ralph Winter (a topper).5 It carries on to 
this day with “conservatives” generally carrying the banner of state competition 
for corporate charters (and Delaware), and “liberals” advocating for reforms or 
more federal intervention in corporate law.6 But politics doesn’t seem to align 
perfectly with views on the debate, since some prominent conservative or 
libertarian law professors have written pieces critical of the state-based model 
and empirical evidence is supposed to be apolitical.7  
 Going backward a step, political views about federalism in general might 
be a piece of the puzzle. But there is nothing sacrosanct about state-based law on 
the right or faulty about it on the left. History is replete with examples in which 
conservatives have supported federal law over state law (tort law, criminal 
sentencing, and marriage are all recent examples) and in which liberals have 
supported state-based law over federal law (euthanasia, medical marijuana, and 
stem cell research are all recent examples).8 Saying one side believes in local 
control or state law generally does not answer the question about how one will 
view the law making process for the law governing corporations.  
 Another related explanation might be that favored political constituencies 
of the two ends of the political spectrum align in ways that predict the outcome – 
maybe Republicans favor managers (over shareholders), and state law favors 
managers, while Democrats favor employees (over investors), and federal law 
would favor them. But these assumptions are specious on both ends – the linkage 
between interest group and party,9 and between the locus of lawmaking and the 
outcome.10 There must be something more than that going on that explains the 
political choices. 
 This essay offers a different and more fundamental explanation for the 
persistence and political alignment of the debate using a recent contribution to 
                                                   
5 See William L. Carey, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 88 YALE L.J. 
663 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
6 See Coffee, supra note 2 at 88. An informal survey bears out this intuition: the leading 
proponents of a race to the top are all politically more or less conservative (Judge Ralph Winter, 
Judge Frank Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel, Stephen Bainbridge, Larry Ribstein, and Roberta 
Romano are prominent examples); while the advocates of a race to the bottom are all more or less 
liberals (Justice Louis Brandeis, William Cary, Lucian Bebchuk, Melvin Eisenberg, and Ralph 
Nader are examples). 
7 For example, Allen Ferrell, a conservative scholar at Harvard Law School, has written papers 
critical of Delaware and the state-based model. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence 
Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1775 (2002). 
8 See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, “The New Blue Federalists,” Salon.com, Posted Thursday, 
Jan. 6, 2005, at 5:56 PM ET, available at http://slate.com/id/2111942/ (“Federalism is not just 
for conservatives, anymore. . . . Local and state governments can be more innovative, daring, and 
proactive—in short, more progressive—than even the liberal Congresses of distant memory.”). 
9 Investors are just as likely to be Republicans as CEOs, and Democrats count among their 
constituencies labor unions, large pension funds, wealthy investors, and Silicon Valley CEOs. 
10 Firms have many divergent constituencies, and there is no easy or theoretical answer as to 
whether managers, shareholders, employees, or other corporate stakeholders are more likely to 
get what they want from the Congress or state legislatures competing with each other. Each type 
of jurisdictional entity is subject to capture by different political forces, and there is no reason 
why a stakeholder behind the veil would, if trying to maximize their slice of the firm at the 
expense of others, choose one form of law making over another.  
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the debate by Professor Robert Ahdieh as a foil.11 Ahdieh’s goal is to break the 
deadlock in this debate by trying to convince the opposing factions that the 
debate is based on a misunderstanding about the role played by state 
competition. Simply put, the race doesn’t matter for corporate governance, so 
everyone should stop talking about it. He argues that corporate governance is 
determined by markets, not state law.12 Specifically, the markets for managerial 
talent and corporate control, not state competition for corporate charters, are 
responsible for the ability of corporate law to restrain the inevitable agency costs 
arising when ownership and control are separated. If true, not only is the race 
debate pointless, but there is nothing special about state-based law. Federal law 
would do just as well in policing intrafirm governance, assuming the “right” 
answers as to optimal corporate law can be discovered by federal regulators.13  
 This essay shows why Ahdieh’s argument is unpersuasive, then offers an 
alternative explanation for the persistence of the debate. On the substance, 
Ahdieh’s argument that “markets” do the work of law avoids the fact that state 
law is ultimately determinative of the nature of the markets. While the market for 
corporate control disciplines managers, it is competition among states that  
disciplines states from distorting the market for corporate control. For instance, 
some important states, like California and New York, have tried to impose 
judicial review of merger contracts or tried to rewrite them to achieve substantive 
fairness.14 Delaware has offered an alternative for firms looking to avoid these 
doctrines. We don’t see more mandatory rules, for good or bad, because of 
corporate federalism.  
 After showing why there really is a debate and why it matters, the essay 
then offers an alternative explanation for its perseverance based on the insight of 
Thomas Sowell about individuals’ competing visions of what makes effective 
public policy. Sowell describes a conflict between a “constrained” and an 
“unconstrained” vision of the world. Those with a constrained vision are skeptical 
of top-down solutions imposed by experts of various kinds, relying instead on 
systemic processes, like markets, families, or tradition, to deal as best as they can 
with social problems. These people tend to be political conservatives and toppers. 
To them, getting the right corporate law rules, be it the rules about takeovers or 
the optimal composition of the board of directors, is something that only can be 
achieved through a process designed to filter good rules from bad. In fact, good 
rules are defined as those that survive such a process. 
In contrast, those with an unconstrained vision believe in solutions, 
instead of second- or third-best tradeoffs, and have more faith in social 
innovations based on expert analysis. These people tend to be political liberals 
                                                   
11 See Robert Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for 
Corporate Governance, __ G.W. L. REV. __ (2009). 
12 Ahdieh does see state competition doing some work in restraining states from too much rent 
seeking vis-à-vis firms—franchise tax rates are kept low because of the threat of reincorporation. 
See id at __.  
13 Ultimately then, Ahdieh, who claims agnosticism about the federal versus state issue, see id at 
__, may provide Delaware’s enemies with the ammunition they need to win the war against state 
corporate law, although for reasons having little to do with manager domination of incorporation 
choices or Delaware’s legislators and judges. 
14 See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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and bottomers. To them, there are obviously right and obviously wrong rules, and 
the existence of obviously wrong ones can be explained by nothing else than a 
failure in process that must be remedied. The race to the bottom is proved by 
evidence of things that the experts believe don’t make sense. Staggered boards, 
Soviet-style elections for corporate boards, permissive review of takeover 
defenses, asymmetric reimbursement of takeover expenses, the ubiquitous use of 
non-indexed stock options, and limited shareholder access to the proxy are just a 
few of the “defects” of Delaware law that experts point to as evidence that the 
state-based system is suboptimal. Those who hold an unconstrained vision of the 
world then propose reforms – usually to simply reverse each of these policies – 
that would, in their view, improve governance for all firms.  
There is, of course, something to be said for both expertise and 
competition; the relevant question is how much of each lead will us to the socially 
optimal result. The debate about how corporate law is made thus boils down to 
how much choice and competition there is for consumers of corporate law. The 
more choice is real and readily available, the less work there is for experts to 
tinker at the edges. It follows, of course, that the less choice available in the 
market, the more intervention that may be needed. The intervention could come 
in two forms: either reforms to the process to enhance competition or choice 
(favored by holders of the constrained vision); or using expertise to make ad hoc 
improvements (favored by holders of the unconstrained vision). In this way, 
Ahdieh is right that the race debate is, unto itself, neither here nor there, but not 
for the reasons he suggests. The question isn’t whether states are racing but 
whether the market for law is working. This is an antitrust-like analysis, since the 
measurement is one of competition and choice. If there are low switching costs, 
ease of entry, no legal barriers, abundant choice, and so forth, or if the market for 
law can be improved by adjusting the process of law making, then it is much 
harder to justify substituting expertise. And vice versa. 
Professor Ahdieh is to be commended for trying to resolve the race debate, 
but since the debate is premised on a conflict of fundamental points of view, it is 
unlikely that a single argument, no matter how interesting and persuasive, is 
likely to achieve this goal. The battle is bigger than corporate law, since these 
points of view clash on innumerable other policy issues. The battle over these 
competing visions was fought by Hayek and Keynes, by Reagan and FDR, and 
countless politicians, economists, and philosophers. Without solving all of 
politics and social policy, there is little hope for solving the race debate.  
The work-a-day world of law professors and policy makers, however, can 
still be valuable, since it is not their job to resolve our most base differences, but 
to tweak the rules slightly here or there. Although beyond the scope of this essay, 
it is possible to look for locus of agreement. Common ground might be found on 
the question of how effective the market is in any particular environment. This 
may be the best hope for empirical scholarship in this field, since it brings the 
debate down to the level of the real-world merits and applicability of the two 
conflicting visions of corporate law. 
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II. Two Tales of State Competition 
 
 The great innovation of American corporate law is the “internal affairs 
doctrine,” which gives a firm a choice of the state in which it incorporates and 
thus the law that will apply to it on matters of corporate governance. Thus, a firm 
started in California with all its employees, facilities, shareholders, and customers 
there can nevertheless chose to be subject to the corporate law of, say, Delaware. 
This means firms anywhere have the option of at least 50 different corporate law 
regimes.15 Thus whether states vigorously compete with each other to attract 
incorporations and reincorporations (and the franchise taxes, prestige, and legal 
work that flows from them) or simply provide alternative law, state law can be 
expected to be relatively responsive to firms’ demands for law. The jurisdiction 
that currently best meets corporate needs is tiny Delaware, home to less than 
0.3% of the US population and accounting for about 0.4% of US GDP,16 but 
providing the basic corporate law for over 60% of large US companies. The fact 
that Delaware does not have 100 percent of the market means there is choice and 
some competition. There is also the threat of departure that exists whether or not 
it is exercised regularly. 
 There is, of course, nothing inevitable about any of this, either in terms of 
the model or the winning jurisdiction.17 Corporate law could be tied to the center 
of gravity of physical assets (the so-called “real seat theory”) or made by a single 
provider, like the federal government. In both of these alternatives, the lawmaker 
looks more like a monopolist, since in the former case switching costs are much 
higher for firms and in the latter one firms have no choice. And the history of 
corporate law (both old and recent) shows states that make laws firms do not 
want find that firms flee to other jurisdictions.18 
 The debate about these two primary alternatives – competitive or 
monopoly provision of law –has carried on in the same terms for decades. 
Defenders of the status quo claim that the state-based model creates a process for 
making law that is likely to minimize the sum of decision costs and error costs. 
Professor Roberta Romano argues that “[s]tate competition for incorporations 
has spurred an innovative legal process that is responsive to a rapidly changing 
                                                   
15 Not all states have entirely different corporate codes, since many have adopted different 
vintages of the Model Business Corporation Act. Each state does have a different judiciary, 
however, so this means even states with the same corporate law statute will have different 
corporate law. 
16 This data can be found at: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/10000.html; 
http://www.localcensus.com/state/Delaware; and  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html. 
17 For a fascinating history on the origins and survival despite political economy story that makes 
it unlikely, see Tung, supra note ___. 
18 New Jersey once dominated the market for corporate law, but after reforms to it instituted by 
then-governor Woodrow Wilson that were undesirable to firms, firms left New Jersey in droves 
for Delaware. See id at __. Today, firms most often incorporate in either their home jurisdiction 
or in Delaware. The difference between the percentage of overall firms by state and the percentage 
incorporated in that state tells us something about the desirability of that state’s corporate law. 
Along this dimension, California, New York, and Massachusetts, three states that try to impose 
the most judicial and statutory intervention on business decisions perform the worst. (Data on file 
with author.) 
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business environment to the benefit of firms and their investors.”19 Very few 
empirical studies are offered in support of these claims.20 Toppers instead rely 
largely on the existence and persistence of the model and the ability to and 
incentives for changing it if it is inefficient. Competition is enough to ensure good 
results, since only efficient laws will survive the Darwinian process.21 The 
important goal for these scholars is ensuring that the process, in this case, a 
market for law, works well and is not systematically biased. As a result, corporate 
law for these scholars starts to look like antitrust, with the inquiry being about 
whether the market (in this case, for law) is competitive.22  
 Critics point to failures of the competitive model to deliver the “optimal” 
corporate law as evidence that the race is not one to the top, but rather the 
bottom.23 These shortcomings are then used to justify either targeted reforms24 
or, more ambitiously, federal intervention or preemption.25 According to 
bottomers, states don’t compete to offer shareholders what they want (a low cost 
of capital) but instead to offer managers, who, after all, make the decision about 
where to incorporate, what they want, which may in fact be a larger share of the 
firm’s surplus at the expense of the shareholders. Professor Lucian Bebchuk 
alone has written nearly 20 papers, most empirical, showing the ways in which 
Delaware law deviates from his view of the optimal law. 
Both sides in the debate likely agree that process for making corporate law 
is imperfect, but differ over what to make of that fact. As discussed below, the 
toppers elevate the process of making law above anything else, believing that the 
right “answers” about corporate governance are beyond the ken of any 
individuals or experts and can only be discovered through the market. Any 
                                                   
19 See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE L. J. 209 (2006).  
20 Toppers do, of course, argue with data too, but these are fewer and far between. For a recent 
example, see Murali Jagannathan and Adam C. Pritchard, "Does Delaware Entrench 
Management?" (December 2008). University of Michigan Legal Working Paper Series. University 
of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series. Working Paper 93. 
http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/olin/art93 (finding Delaware directors are superior to other 
states’ directors on many dimensions). 
21 This is a strongly Burkean notion of efficiency, and as we’ll see, one attractive to a limited 
number and particular type of individual. 
22 Romano and like-minded scholars believe so passionately that competition makes better law 
than monopoly, say of the federal government, that they want to use the process in other areas of 
law, like the regulation of securities. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). 
23 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002) (“Because managers have substantial influence over where companies 
are incorporated, a state that wishes to maximize the number of corporations chartered in it will 
have to take into account the interests of managers. As a result, state competition pushes states to 
give significant weight to managerial interests.”). 
24 See Lucian Bechuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, 
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002) (proposing eliminating staggered boards). 
25 See, e.g., Symposium, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L. J. 71 
(1972) (asserting that state chartering has failed); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf 
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate 
Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 585-95 (2002) (arguing for a federal role in corporate law since there 
is not much competition and Delaware has an incentive to favor managers at the expense of 
shareholders). 
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defects should be tolerated because the tradeoffs are too complex to make using 
an ad hoc process (if they are defects at all). The risk from tinkering with the 
process is a game that isn’t worth the candle. The bottomers, by contrast, believe 
in expert intervention based on evidence and are distrustful of relying entirely on 
processes to deliver optimal outcomes, especially in the face of the application of 
power by particular interests. This essay argues, in section III below, that it is this 
difference in vision of the world and of law that drives the debate. 
 In contrast, Professor Ahdieh argues that the reason for the debate’s 
persistence is a misunderstanding among the debaters about what the debate is 
about. Ahdieh thinks there is little or no role for state law in determining the 
optimal allocation of rights among managers, shareholders, and other 
constituents of the firm, claiming that “the quality of corporate governance is 
determined by efficient markets, not efficient competition among states.” Let us 
consider this explanation before offering an alternative explanation. 
 
III. Law Influences Markets 
 
 According to Professor Ahdieh’s argument, managers allocate rights 
within the firm efficiently not because law tells them how to do so, but rather 
because markets (for labor, products, and capital) demand that they do. This 
must be at least partially true, since markets and law work together to achieve 
optimal governance arrangements. But in rightfully elevating the role of markets 
to an essential role in corporate governance, Ahdieh overplays his hand. The 
markets on which he relies on are not independent of law,26 but rather 
determined by the details of state law, which in turn are dramatically influenced 
by the process in which that law is made.  
 Many state law doctrines determine the relative efficiency of markets. 
Laws banning certain types of merger structures, permitting judicial review of 
transactions for substantive fairness, imposing fiduciary duties on shareholders, 
and banning the sale of control for a premium are all examples of state laws that 
dictate how corporate governance is played out in markets. For example, a state 
that (by statute or precedent) gives judges a greater role in reviewing merger or 
compensation contracts or that has a more competent judiciary or requires 
sharing of takeover expenses will have a different markets for labor and corporate 
control than a state that has the opposite rules. The market for corporate control 
works differently in California than it does in Delaware. Ahdieh glides past this 
important point because of two faulty assumptions about corporate law. 
 First, he assumes that state law is comprised primarily of default rules that 
managers and shareholders can opt into or out of by contract. In Ahdieh’s 
hypothetical world, managers and shareholders can avoid bad state law “simply 
[by] waiv[ing] the relevant statutory authorizations . . . in their corporate charter 
or bylaws.”27 Much state law, and nearly all controversial state law, however, is 
mandatory and cannot be waived. In that case, the only refuge for managers and 
shareholders wanting different rules is to incorporate in a jurisdiction that offers 
                                                   
26 Ahdieh believes state competition for law impacts only the amount of corporate wealth that the 
state can take for itself through taxes. See Ahdieh, supra note __ at ___. 
27 Ahdieh, supra note __ at __.  
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different choices. If there aren’t such places, one can expect much worse 
corporate law. States have tried over the years to impose on firms a litany of 
mandatory obligations, including: a judicially reviewed “business purpose” for 
transactions and deal structures,28 a requirement that firms pursue only lines of 
business approved by state legislatures,29 judicial approval of executive 
compensation contracts,30 a requirement for controlling shareholders to share 
merger premia with minority shareholders,31 and a ban on certain takeover 
defenses.32 This last example illustrates the point. Simply comparing a state like 
Delaware, where courts have authorized firms to legally deploy a poison pill as an 
anti-takeover device, and California, where the courts have not, allows one to see 
how different the market for corporate control will be for firms incorporated in 
these two states. Each of these mandatory rules would impact firms and the 
markets in which they operate (for better or worse).  
 Consider a prominent example. Courts in some states have held that 
shareholders owe each other fiduciary duties like those owed by partners. In 
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court disregarded the fact that the four founding shareholders opted for the 
corporate form, where shareholders qua shareholders owe no special duties, and 
imposed on them partnership-like fiduciary duties.33 The ruling had the effect of 
collapsing the available business form choices for entrepreneurs by one, since 
there was now some possibility that even though one deliberately chose the 
corporate form, a court would later rewrite the contract in favor of another form 
that would achieve the court’s preferred allocation of justice in a particular case. 
The impact of this rule could be, if widely adopted, significant, since it would 
presumably raise the cost of capital for firms at the formation stage, and could 
implicate change of control transactions at later stages. The rule did not 
persevere in the market. Courts in Delaware and elsewhere reject the doctrine, 
holding that shareholders are bound by the contracts they write, and that no 
amount of sympathy for the plaintiffs can trump this free contracting model of 
corporate law.34 Whatever one’s view of the efficiency or desirability of this 
doctrine and the others described above, it is undeniable that they would have a 
big impact on the markets for labor and control.  
                                                   
28 See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
29 See, e.g., Oliver v. Rahway Ice Co., 54 A. 460, 461 (N.J. Ch. 1903) (holding that a corporation 
that repurchases its stock for “legitimate corporate pruposes” is not acting “controlultra vires).  
30 See, e.g., Gallin v. National City Bank of New York, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 114 (1934) (establishing 
judicially reviewed “rule of reason” for executive pay: “To come within the rule of reason the 
compensation must be in proportion to the executive's ability, services and time devoted to the 
company, difficulties involved, responsibilities assumed, success achieved, amounts under 
jurisdiction, corporation earnings, profits and prosperity, increase in volume or quality of 
business or both, and all other relevant facts and circumstances; nor should it be unfair to 
stockholders in unduly diminishing dividends properly payable.”). 
31 See, e.g., Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 27 F. 625, 631-32 (1886) (requiring majority 
shareholders to share “the fruits of the sale” equally with minority shareholders). 
32 California, for instance, is the only state that has not validated the use of the “poison pill” 
takeover defense. See Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 
Yale L. J. 621, 629 (2003). 
33 370 Mass. 842 (1976). 
34 See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993). 
   Constrained Vision  /  9
These doctrines are largely passé as a result of firms opting to incorporate 
in Delaware, which has none of them. We don’t see more mandatory corporate 
rules, like those prominent in Massachusetts (and California and elsewhere), 
precisely because of the state competition model that allows firms the exit option 
of Delaware. Whether Delaware and the other states could be said to be 
“competing” or the different jurisdictions simply provide choice is beside the 
point, since either provides discipline on the quality of law provided by a 
particular state. 
 A second and related faulty assumption that Ahdieh makes is that state 
law is mostly statutory. While some states do have detailed corporate statutes, 
Delaware law is primarily based on judicial precedent layered over a bare bones 
code. When firms choose to incorporate in Delaware (and elsewhere), they are 
choosing not only the existing law (statutes plus cases), but also to delegate the 
resolution of future disputes to the state’s court.35 Given the ease of exit for firms, 
either through incorporation choice or by contract, one can reasonably conclude 
that the behavior of the delegatee is highly dependent on the possibility that bad 
decisions will drive businesses from the state. Thus whatever competitive or 
choice pressures operate for statutes also operate for case law. If a court 
innovates too much or too little companies may choose to incorporate or 
reincorporate elsewhere, or, as has often been the case recently, the federal 
government will intervene.36  
Emblematic of the choice offered by case law is the fact that Delaware 
courts have resisted the tendency of other courts to intervene in business 
decisions. Consider, for instance, the treatment of mergers in which majority 
shareholders cash out minority shareholders. In Coggins v. New England 
Patriots Football Club, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (again) 
held that the merger in question “was a freeze-out merger undertaken for no 
legitimate business purpose” and thus awarded damages to the minority 
shareholders.37 Delaware rejects any role for courts in evaluating the reason for 
mergers or their structures. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the Delaware Supreme 
Court overturned prior precedents in accord with Coggins, holding that “the 
business purpose requirement of [prior cases] shall no longer be of any force or 
effect.”38 A business purpose requirement raises the costs of takeovers by 
increasing the risk of litigation and giving minority shareholders hold-up 
power.39 This means the market for corporate control will be fundamentally 
different for Massachusetts firms than Delaware firms. This hands-off approach 
undoubtedly distinguishes Delaware corporate law from other jurisdictions.  
                                                   
35 In the case of Delaware, a specialized and expert business court, known as the Chancery. 
36 See, e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002) 
(federalizing substantial portions of corporate governance, such as the composition of the board 
of directors). 
37 397 Mass. 525, 534-5 (1986). 
38 457 A.2d 701 (1983). 
39 Unrestrained courts can impose costs on firms by virtue of the creation of uncertainty, the 
elimination of certain mutually beneficial value-creating transactions, the ability of competitors 
or interest-groups to use the law to hold up the firm to extract rents or achieve business 
advantage, and simply through the imposition of deadweight legal costs. 
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It seem uncontroversial to suggest that the rule governing mergers and 
other corporate transactions would be different, perhaps strikingly so (for better 
and worse), if law was made by a monopolist. Support for this can be found in the 
way in which law makers have acted in the current environment. States that have 
more restrictive corporate law have tried to impose these rules on all firms that 
have “significant contacts” with the jurisdiction, regardless of the state of 
incorporation. For example, California law requires firms to have a legitimate 
business purpose for transactions and looks past the form of corporate 
transactions to equilibrate substantive outcomes – it tries to extend Coggins-like 
protections to shareholders of firms incorporated in other jurisdictions, like 
Delaware.40 The ability to do this is untested but unlikely under current Delaware 
law, and therefore this example shows how the law would be different but for the 
choice of Delaware.  
Federal corporate law, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, is an example of law 
that is set by a monopolist, since no US firm can opt out of this law.41 The process 
for writing and passing SOX, as well as its application have been widely criticized, 
and yet there has been no substantial reform or repeal of its provisions.42 
Whether SOX is good or bad, however, is beside the point. The issue is that we 
cannot know for sure whether it is good or bad without the market test provided 
by exit.43 In fact, the most significant call for reform has come from those – like 
New York financial interests and politicians – who would be hurt by firms opting 
to incorporate or raise money outside of the US.44 They cite, as evidence of the 
law’s demerits the fact that firms are doing just this.45 
                                                   
40 California Corporate Code ∫ 2115(b)-(c) (requiring shareholder voting and appraisal rights 
provisions (among others) apply to foreign corporations with minimal contacts in California). 
41 It is possible to opt out by incorporating abroad, but this is much more costly. 
42 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 Yale L. J. 1521 (2005). Another monopolist-imposed regulation that has 
garnered widespread criticism but is nevertheless mandatory is the Williams Act of 1968. See 
Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35, Stan. L. Rev. 
1, 16-17 (1982) (criticizing how the Williams Act replaced a private law model that worked). 
43 The interlinking of corporate law and corporate finance, and the impact on the market for 
corporate control, can be seen in the recent experience in Europe where Germany, among others, 
moved away from the real seat doctrine to an American-style internal affairs doctrine. For 
example, German companies can now incorporate elsewhere in Europe, and a large percentage of 
start-up firms are choosing the United Kingdom. This is not because UK “markets” or “finance” 
are different or that UK franchise taxes are lower, but rather that the corporate law rules and 
precedents allow firms to offer investors (and other stakeholders) a more optimal set of 
contracting arrangements. The exit threat for German firms can be expected to have an impact on 
German law. If Germany (meaning, its people, legislators, judges, lawyers, or fisc) wants to 
maintain the importance of German corporate law, it must compete with UK law by abandoning 
those policies that are driving away firms.  
44 New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Senator Charles Schumer commissioned a study by 
McKinsey & Company on the subject of financial services compeitiveness in the wake of 
increasing federal involvement in corporate governance. See McKinsey & Company, Sustaining 
New York’s and the US’ Global Financial Services Leadership, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special_reports/2007/NY_REP
ORT%20_FINAL.pdf. The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation has issued a series of 
reports on improving the regulation of US capital markets detailing the flight of capital raising 
outside of the US borders. The reports are available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/.   
45 id. 
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 Having shown that state law matters and that the debate about state 
competition is not based on a mistake, the next section offers an alternative 
explanation for the persistence of the debate.  
 
IV. Two Visions of Corporate Law 
 
 The field of academic corporate law is conceived entirely differently by 
holders of two different social visions of the world. The reason the race debate 
continues is because it is really a debate about the validity of these competing 
visions. The two sides aren’t mistaken, as Ahdieh argues, but are merely talking 
past each other. Without reconciling these visions, the debate will persist in the 
face of any and all evidence one way or the other.  
 According to Thomas Sowell, many of our modern policy debates boil 
down to a question of one’s view of the capacity of the human mind and the 
institutions it develops to solve problems. It is a debate about experts versus 
markets.46 In one camp, we find those who believe that optimal social policy is 
something that can be discovered by experts based on an analysis of data and 
argument. The problem with schools or health care or crime policy,47 they say, is 
that the right people aren’t in charge, or we don’t have enough money to 
implement the right solutions, or we just need more research on the questions to 
determine the correct approach. The right answers, the socially optimal answers, 
are there for the getting. Those holding this vision—what Sowell calls the 
“unconstrained vision”—believe there are solutions to policy problems that are 
discernable from the reason and logic of smart people. They believe in experts. 
Sowell describes the “unconstrained vision” as follows: “the conviction that 
foolish or immoral choices explain the evils of the world – and that wiser or more 
moral and humane social policies are the solution.”48 The French Revolution and 
the Administrative State are manifestations of the unconstrained vision. So too 
are the arguments of Ronald Dworkin, Jean-Jacque Rosseau, Thorstein Veblen, 
and Franklin Roosevelt. 
 In the other camp, we find those who believe that social problems are not 
comprehendible by the human mind and that no amount of conferences, policy 
papers, or deep thinking will find solutions for them.49  There are no solutions, 
just tradeoffs. Sowell describes the “constrained vision” as seeing “the evils of the 
world as deriving from the limited and unhappy choices available, given the 
inherent moral and intellectual limitations of human beings.” The constrained 
vision sees natural processes, like competition in free markets, as a superior way 
of revealing socially efficient answers to policy questions. Unlike those 
                                                   
46 This obviously oversimplifies things. Experts matter. Markets matter.  
47 The debate between the two predominant approaches to crime reduction—rehabilitation versus 
punishment—is an archetypical example of the conflict of visions. Those believing in 
rehabilitation generally view man as good but corrupted by society, while those believing in 
punishment view man as inherently evil and must be civilized and controlled by incentives.  
48 THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLES 32 
(Basic 2007). 
49 This is not to say that academic inquiry is irrelevant. For instance, study and data can support 
the analysis of the tradeoffs that must be made by market participants, as well as if the market is 
working or is plagued by market failures. 
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subscribing to the unconstrained vision who believe in solutions passed down by 
experts, the constrained vision “rely[s] on the systemic characteristics of certain 
social processes such as moral traditions, the marketplace, or families.”50 They 
believe in the wisdom of crowds and evolutionary processes.51 Perhaps the most 
succinct summary of the constrained vision is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
aphorism that “[t]he life of law has not been logic: it has been experience.”52 The 
American Revolution and faith in Adam Smith’s invisible hand are 
manifestations of the constrained vision. So too are the arguments of Edmund 
Burke, F.A. Hayek, and Ronald Reagan. 
 In corporate law, a holder of the constrained vision will be suspicious of 
studies or arguments purporting to offer solutions or obvious improvements in 
the way corporations are run or governed. They will be skeptical of the 
perfectibility of the behavior of firms or individuals or law by expert-based 
reforms. They will rely instead on processes, like a market for law and products, 
to ensure that the optimal law is produced. If asked “What is good corporate 
law?”, one holding this vision would reply, “Why the law that survives in free 
markets, of course.” Paraphrasing Holmes, Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel 
claim that “[t]he best [corporate law] structure cannot be derived from theory; it 
must be developed by experience,” and that competition and choice are essential 
to develop this experience.53 Holders of the constrained vision are more 
concerned about ensuring that the market works than for looking for defects or 
expressions of power. This means that these scholars will be specious of 
arguments about how powerful individuals or groups can dominate others 
despite the existence of robust markets.  
In the unconstrained camp, many lawyers, professors, and politicians 
purport to offer proof of what the law should be, that is, how Delaware could be 
more efficient. Law and finance journals are filled with claims of this sort. For 
example, Lucian Bebchuk (a lawyer) and Alma Cohen (an economist) claim that 
firms with staggered boards (that is, where the entire board cannot be replaced in 
a single election) are valued less than firms without staggered boards by 3 to 4 
percent.54 This is a staggering figure, and if true, would suggest that the firms 
with staggered boards—about half of those incorporated in Delaware—are leaving 
serious money on the table. In fact, one recent paper estimates the impact of 
destaggering boards of Delaware firms at over $40 billion in shareholder value, 
and argues for a law requiring firms to destagger their boards.55 Bebchuk and 
others therefore argue that Delaware should ban staggered boards.  
                                                   
50 Id at 33. 
51 See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (Anchor 2005). 
52 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881). 
53 FRANK EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
(Harvard 1996) (“The history of corporations has been that firms failing to adapt their governance 
structures are ground under by competition.  The history of corporate law has been that states 
attempting to force all firms into a single mold are ground under aw well.”) 
54 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. Fin. Econ. 409, 
428 (2005).  
55 See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note __, at 422 fig.3; Michal Barzuza, Delaware’s Compensation, 
94 Va. L. Rev. 521, 543 (2008) (arguing that Delaware should change its franchise tax structure to 
give legislators incentives to create this value). 
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 These empirical studies and the normative analyses that flow from them 
are classic examples of the unconstrained vision of the corporate world. There is 
an observation of reality that is linked with a deviation from an idealized perfect 
world coupled with a suggested solution to remedy the problem. Smart people 
have considered the issue and proposed a solution consistent with an analysis of 
data. This leap from description to proscription is based on a belief in expert-
based solutions to discrete problems. The belief in these solutions relies not only 
the claim that the researchers possess greater knowledge than the rest of society, 
but also that the knowledge they possess can isolate solutions that make perfect 
tradeoffs with other considerations.56  
The constrained vision, in contrast, sees many forces at work beyond the 
ken of corporate scholars or even participants in the decision making in question. 
These may justify the status quo notwithstanding what the data say. This is an 
argument for what F. A. Hayek called favoring “custom over understanding.”57  
  A constrained vision doesn’t mean ignoring facts or data, but it expresses 
a preference for what Sowell calls “social processes,” rather than expert opinions, 
to act as the judge of what is and what is not efficient and optimal.58 In short, the 
constrained vision is about “analyz[ing], prescrib[ing], or judg[ing] only process,” 
while the unconstrained vision seeks to “analyze, prescribe, and judge results.”59 
In corporate law, this means that those with a unconstrained vision will be 
concerned with outcomes, criticizing results that seem contrary to wisdom, logic, 
or data. Those with the constrained vision will be unmoved, being concerned only 
with ensuring processes, like the market, exist to help achieve the best results 
possible.  
 A key operative social process in corporate law is the market for state 
charters, which restrains regulatory overreach and yields the relatively bare 
bones corporate codes, the enabling/free contracting model, the business 
judgment rule, and relatively light judicial intervention in policing corporate 
transactions. (Professor Ahdieh believes the relevant process is the market for 
                                                   
56 “Nothing is good but in proportion and with reference.” EDMUND BURKE, THE CORRESPONDENCE 
OF EDMUND BURKE, VOL. VI, 47 (Chicago 1967). 
57 F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty 157 (Chicago 1979) (“[M]an has certainly more often 
learnt to do the right thing without comprehending why it was the right thing, and he is still better 
served by custom than understanding.”). 
58 Critics of the unconstrained vision have empirical studies of their own. In a recent paper, 
Murali Jagannathan and Adam Pritchard find that managers in Delaware are less entrenched, of 
higher quality, and more accountable than directors in other states. Murali Jagannathan and 
Adam C. Pritchard, "Does Delaware Entrench Management?" (December 2008). University of 
Michigan Legal Working Paper Series. University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & 
Economics Working Paper Series. Working Paper 93. 
http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/olin/art93. These findings are inconsistent with claims about 
a race-to-the-bottom. More importantly, they point indirectly to the claim that there is inevitably 
a tradeoff between governance mechanisms in a firm. So Bebchuk and Cohen may be right that 
staggered boards are a management entrenchment device, but this is only part of a more complex 
tradeoff in firm governance that is unknowable to anyone in the process, either insider or outside 
of a particular firm. Disrupting it would be counterproductive, since it would be premised on 
claims of efficiency based on limited science instead of long-standing practice and custom. It also 
might cause increased uncertainty about other elements of governance, which would then create 
costs on the system.  
59 Id at 94. 
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corporate control, but, as shown above, this is derivative of the state competition 
model.) For those with a constrained vision, maintaining the integrity of this 
market and ensuring it is not prevented from working is paramount. Claims that 
it is not working and should be abandoned because of unjust or seemingly 
unreasonable outcomes based on things like “power” are treated with 
skepticism.60  
A nice example of the difference can be seen in the debate about executive 
compensation. Professor Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried argue that managers 
control the pay setting process, and that as a result pay is excessive and delinked 
from performance.61 Managerial power allows CEOs to cheat shareholders by 
hiding pay and entrenching themselves in office. Critics find these “beat the 
market” claims hard to believe, since CEO pay is widely disclosed and CEOs 
operate in robust and highly competitive markets for labor (as well as capital and 
products).62 The criticism is something like: if asked to trust a robust market for 
labor with thousands of firms and smart investors betting their own money or 
two academics, which one is more likely to have the right answer about the best 
way to pay? Critics also offer other descriptions more consistent with a benign 
explanation of the practices,63 as well as concern that the proposed reforms of 
executive compensation may have unintended consequences that would do harm 
that exceeds any benefits they might offer.64 Perhaps more fundamentally, 
however, is the concern that giving others – in this case, shareholders, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, and judges – the power to set pay may shift the power in firms generally, 
allowing these groups to do other things that might be disrupt the social utility 
firms provide. 
These two visions describe the two rival camps in the race debate. One side 
is largely composed of those with faith in experts and the ability to determine 
optimal governance through ad hoc examination of data, while the other side 
believes in establishing processes, like the market, which will be used to 
determine what the best rules are based on perseverance not logic. Although this 
                                                   
60 “The constrained vision, in which systemic processes produce many results not planned or 
controlled by anyone, gives power a much smaller explanatory role, thus offering fewer 
opportunities for moral judgments and fewer prospects for sweeping reforms to be successful in 
achieving their goals.” SOWELL, supra note __ at 156. 
61 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Harvard 2004). 
62 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 Tex. L. Rev.  1615 
(2005) (“In competitive capital markets, if managerial power and the resultant capture of rents by 
management were serious concerns, we would expect to see firms opting out of the default rules 
that allegedly permit management capture of the board.”); M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in 
Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low,  101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543 
(2007) (casting claims of managerial power explaining executive pay into doubt by finding CEO 
pay is similar in terms and amounts in high and low agency costs environments). 
63 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1901 (2001) (arguing that proposals for firms to adopt indexed stock options would raise 
managerial risk seeking levels to socially inefficient levels). 
64 “The unconstrained vision seeks the best individual decisions, arrived at seriatim and in an ad 
hoc fashion. By contrast, the constrained vision trades off the benefits of both wisdom and virtue 
against the benefits of stability of expectations and standards.” SOWELL, CONFLICT OF VISIONS, 
supra note __ at 84. 
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is the foundation of the debate, it is not explicitly recognized as so. 
 
V. Resolving Conflicting Visions 
 
The rise of empirical corporate law scholarship might have been expected 
to resolve the race debate, but multivariate regressions purporting to show the 
optimal corporate governance arrangements have yet to substantially move 
policy makers. There have been literally hundreds of studies showing how 
staggered boards or unified chair and CEO roles or some other feature of 
Delaware corporate law is destructive of firm value, and yet Delaware and its 
defenders are unmoved. Why? 
We can guess that resistance is based not just on a technical refutation of 
the data, methodology, or analysis in these studies, but is based on the nature of 
the project itself. Scholars aren’t reaching different conclusions, they are arguing 
on entirely different ground. For defenders of Delaware, there are no models big 
or sophisticated enough to answer the questions about optimal corporate 
governance. The constrained vision of corporate law suggests that the best way to 
do things is discovered only through trial and error in the market. States 
(meaning, legislatures and judges) and firms that choose well in corporate 
governance will survive, while those that do not will face the choice of copying or 
extinction. For these individuals, the danger of empirical analysis of the sort so 
popular today is that changes will be made to systems and arrangements beyond 
the ken of any expert or policy maker, and that the losses from unintended 
consequences will dwarf any gains from the reforms.65  
But, as this essay has shown, this view is contested by those holding a 
different vision of corporate law. These individuals believe in expert analysis 
either as a substitute for or compliment to markets, and the data show that the 
markets relied on by those with the constrained vision are not working well 
enough. For example, they argue that the persistence of staggered boards, the use 
of poison pills, the largess of executive pay, and so on can only be explained by a 
market failure sufficient to justify large reforms of the process or its outcomes. 
Although these competing visions are in some ways irreconcilable, there is 
a way forward in the debate. The first step is to recognize the debate as it is waged 
today is mostly between two competing visions, and that this distorts the analysis 
and perception by both sides. Once these priors are surfaced, the second step is to 
acknowledge the obvious: there is room for both expertise and markets to play a 
role in creating optimal social arrangements. Even the most ardent fans of 
market-based solutions will recognize that markets don’t always work and that 
there is sometimes room not only for improved market processes but also for 
                                                   
65 This may be because they are part of a package of law that cannot be readily disaggregated, and 
the package as a whole is the best we can expect net of transaction costs. Powerful boards may 
indeed lower takeover premia, but they may do other things, like better oversee the firm’s 
managers or provide long-term focus, that compensate for this cost but that aren’t captured by 
the models. As a matter of law making, the same tradeoff may be present: the attitude in 
Delaware’s courts and legislature that permits staggered boards (perhaps wrongly) may be 
essential for reducing the sum of decision costs and error costs when it comes to judicial review of 
corporate transactions. 
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experts to tinker at the edges of what markets can do. And, likewise, the most 
extreme critics of markets and believers in experts will recognize that competitive 
processes, if well designed and functioning, can help us figure out what the 
socially optimal answers are. The question is where to exercise markets and 
experts and in what proportions. Each of these sides in the debate will start from 
different presumptions about the effective way to make corporate law, and it is in 
the middle where they meet where the real work of corporate law is to be done.66  
This is where the final step can occur. Corporate law scholarship can look 
like antitrust by defining what a successful market for law would look like, and 
then addressing the question of whether the market is working against that 
metric. Measuring success would not be based on whether some shareholders, 
firms, or CEOs do well or poorly, but on whether corporate law is designed 
effectively to create competition. Are barriers to entry for alternative law makers 
low or high? Are switching costs for firms high or low? Is discrimination or 
exclusion through control possible? Do consumers (in this case, firms, 
shareholders, entrepreneurs, and so on) have many options or few? If the market 
is free, so to speak, the calls for expert tweaks will be much weaker. If it is not, the 
question can then be about the best way to remedy any market failures.67  
Even if everyone agrees that there is a market failure, however, the holders 
of different visions of corporate law may have different opinions about the best 
solutions. Believers in the unconstrained vision will call for reforms to 
substantive outcomes (e.g., cap CEO pay), while believers in the constrained 
vision will prefer tweaks to the process to make it more efficient (e.g., increase 
the efficiency of the labor market for CEOs). Although the conflicting visions will 
still argue about what to do, this will at least be a starting point from which 
competing proposals for reform can be measured. Knowing where each side is 
coming from—competing visions about the relative importance of expertise 
versus markets—is a step toward better understanding the debate and someday 
resolving it.  
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66 These presumptions will undoubtedly influence how easily one moves to the middle, and what 
one thinks should be done there. See Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 
J. L. & Econ. 1, 2 (1964) (“Laissez faire has never been more than a slogan in defense of the 
proposition that every extension of state activity should be examined under a presumption of 
error.”). 
67 For a recent (but unpersuasive) paper in this spirit, see, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The 
Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679 (2002). 
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